PART V: SPECIFIC AID INSTRUMENTS

State Guarantees

1 Introduction

1.1 Background

This Chapter updates the EFTA Surveillance Authority’s approach to state aid granted in the form of guarantees and aims to give EFTA States more detailed guidance about the principles on which the EFTA Surveillance Authority intends to base its interpretation of Articles 61 and 62 of the EEA Agreement, as well as Protocol 3 of the Surveillance and Court Agreement, and their application to state guarantees. These principles are currently laid down in the existing Chapter of the EFTA Surveillance Authority’s State Aid Guidelines on state guarantees. Experience gained in the application of the existing Chapter since 2000 suggests that the EFTA Surveillance Authority’s policy in this area should be reviewed. In this connection, the EFTA Surveillance Authority wishes to recall for instance the recent practice of the European Commission in various specific decisions with respect to the need to undertake an individual assessment of the risk of losses related to each guarantee in the case of schemes. The EFTA Surveillance Authority intends to further make its policy in this area as transparent as possible so that its decisions are predictable and that equal treatment is ensured. In particular, the EFTA Surveillance Authority wishes to provide small and medium-sized enterprises (hereafter “SMEs”) and EFTA States with safe harbours predetermining, for a given company and on the basis of its financial rating, the minimum margin that should be charged for a state guarantee in order to be deemed as not constituting aid within the scope of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. Likewise, any shortfall in the premium charged in comparison with that level could be deemed as the aid element.

1.2 Types of guarantee

In their most common form, guarantees are associated with a loan or other financial obligation to be contracted by a borrower with a lender; they may be granted as individual guarantees or within guarantee schemes.

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However, various forms of guarantee may exist, depending on their legal basis, the type of transaction covered, their duration, etc. Without the list being exhaustive, the following forms of guarantee can be identified:

1. general guarantees, i.e. guarantees provided to undertakings as such as opposed to guarantees linked to a specific transaction, which may be a loan, an equity investment, etc;

2. guarantees provided by a specific instrument as opposed to guarantees linked to the status of the undertaking itself;

3. guarantees provided directly or counter guarantees provided to a first level guarantor;

4. unlimited guarantees as opposed to guarantees limited in amount and/or time. The EFTA Surveillance Authority also regards as aid in the form of a guarantee the more favourable funding terms obtained by enterprises whose legal form rules out bankruptcy or other insolvency procedures or provides an explicit state guarantee or coverage of losses by the State. The same applies to the acquisition by a State of a holding in an enterprise if unlimited liability is accepted instead of the usual limited liability;

5. guarantees clearly originating from a contractual source (such as formal contracts, letters of comfort) or another legal source as opposed to guarantees whose form is less visible (such as side letters, oral commitments), possibly with various levels of comfort that can be provided by this guarantee.

Especially in the latter case, the lack of appropriate legal or accounting records often leads to very poor traceability. This is true both for the beneficiary and for the State or public body providing it and, as a result, for the information available to third parties.

1.3 Structure and scope of the Chapter

For the purpose of this Chapter:

(a) “guarantee scheme” means any tool on the basis of which, without further implementing measures being required, guarantees can be provided to undertakings respecting certain conditions of duration, amount, underlying transaction, type or size of undertakings (such as SMEs);

(b) “individual guarantee” means any guarantee provided to an undertaking and not awarded on the basis of a guarantee scheme.

Sections 3 and 4 of this Chapter are designed to be directly applicable to guarantees linked to a specific financial transaction such as a loan. The EFTA Surveillance Authority considers that, owing to their frequency and the fact that they can usually be quantified, these are the cases where guarantees most need to be classed as constituting state aid or otherwise.

As in most cases the transaction covered by a guarantee would be a loan, the Chapter will further refer to the principal beneficiary of the guarantee as the “borrower” and to the body whose risk is diminished by the state guarantee as the “lender”. The use of these two specific terms also aims to facilitate understanding of the rationale underpinning the text, since the basic principle of a loan is broadly understood. However, it does not ensue that sections 3 and 4 are only applicable to a loan guarantee. They apply to all guarantees...
where a similar transfer of risk takes place such as an investment in the form of equity, provided the relevant risk profile (including the possible lack of collateralisation) is taken into account.

The Chapter applies to all economic sectors, including the transport sector, without prejudice to specific rules relating to guarantees in the sector concerned.

This Chapter does not apply to export credit guarantees.

1.4 Other types of guarantee

Where certain forms of guarantee (see point 1.2) involve a transfer of risk to the guarantor and where they do not display one or more of the specific features referred to in point 1.3, for instance insurance guarantees, a case-by-case analysis will have to be made for which, as far as is necessary, the applicable sections or methodologies described in this Chapter will be applied.

1.5 Neutrality

This Chapter applies without prejudice to Article 125 of the EEA Agreement and thus does not prejudice the rules in the EFTA States governing the system of property ownership. The EEA Agreement is neutral as regards public and private ownership.

In particular, the mere fact that the ownership of an undertaking is largely in public hands is not sufficient in itself to constitute a state guarantee provided there are no explicit or implicit guarantee elements.

2 Applicability of Article 61(1)

2.1 General remarks

Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement states that any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through state resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

These general criteria equally apply to guarantees. As for other forms of potential aid, guarantees given directly by the State, namely by central, regional or local authorities, as well as guarantees given through state resources by other state-controlled bodies such as undertakings and imputable to public authorities, may constitute state aid.

In order to avoid any doubts, the notion of state resources should thus be clarified as regards state guarantees. The benefit of a state guarantee is that the risk associated with the guarantee is carried by the State. Such risk-carrying by the State should normally be remunerated by an appropriate premium. Where the State forgoes all or part of such a premium, there is both a benefit for the undertaking and a drain on the resources of the State. Thus, even if it turns out that no payments are ever made by the State under a guarantee, there may nevertheless be state aid under Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.

The aid is granted at the moment when the guarantee is given, not when the guarantee is invoked nor when payments are made under the terms of the guarantee. Whether or not a guarantee constitutes state aid, and, if so, what the amount of that state aid may be, must be assessed at the moment when the guarantee is given.

In this context the EFTA Surveillance Authority points out that the analysis under state aid rules does not prejudge the compatibility of a given measure with other provisions of the EEA Agreement.

2.2 Aid to the borrower

Usually, the aid beneficiary is the borrower. As indicated under point 2.1, risk-carrying should normally be remunerated by an appropriate premium. When the borrower does not need to pay the premium, or pays a low premium, it obtains an advantage. Compared to a situation without guarantee, the state guarantee enables the borrower to obtain better financial terms for a loan than those normally available on the financial markets. Typically, with the benefit of the state guarantee, the borrower can obtain lower rates and/or offer less security. In some cases, the borrower would not, without a state guarantee, find a financial institution prepared to lend on any terms. State guarantees may thus facilitate the creation of new business and enable certain undertakings to raise money in order to pursue new activities. Likewise, a state guarantee may help a failing firm remain active instead of being eliminated or restructured, thereby possibly creating distortions of competition.

2.3 Aid to the lender

2.3.1. Even if usually the aid beneficiary is the borrower, it cannot be ruled out that under certain circumstances the lender, too, will directly benefit from the aid. In particular, for example, if a state guarantee is given ex post in respect of a loan or other financial obligation already entered into without the terms of this loan or financial obligation being adjusted, or if one guaranteed loan is used to pay back another, non-guaranteed loan to the same credit institution, then there may also be aid to the lender, in so far as the security of the loans is increased. Where the guarantee contains aid to the lender, attention should be drawn to the fact that such aid might, in principle, constitute operating aid.

2.3.2. Guarantees differ from other state aid measures, such as grants or tax exemptions, in that, in the case of a guarantee, the State also enters into a legal relationship with the lender. Therefore, consideration has to be given to the possible consequences for third parties of state aid that has been illegally granted. In the case of state guarantees for loans, this concerns mainly the lending financial institutions. In the case of guarantees for bonds issued to obtain financing for undertakings, this concerns the financial institutions involved in the issuance of the bonds. The question whether the illegality of the aid affects the legal relations between the State and third parties is a matter which has to be examined under national law. National courts may have to examine whether national law prevents the guarantee contracts from being honoured, and in that assessment the EFTA Surveillance Authority considers that they should take account of the breach of EEA law. Accordingly, lenders may have an interest in verifying, as a standard precaution, that the EEA rules on state aid have been observed whenever guarantees are granted. An EFTA State should be able to provide a case number
issued by the EFTA Surveillance Authority for an individual case or a scheme and possibly a non-confidential copy of the EFTA Surveillance Authority’s decision together with the relevant reference to the Official Journal of the European Union. The EFTA Surveillance Authority for its part will do its utmost to make available in a transparent manner information on cases and schemes approved by it.

3 Conditions ruling out the existence of aid

3.1 General considerations

If an individual guarantee or a guarantee scheme entered into by the State does not bring any advantage to an undertaking, it will not constitute state aid.

In this context, in order to determine whether an advantage is being granted through a guarantee or a guarantee scheme, the European Court of Justice has confirmed in its recent judgments that the European Commission should base its assessment on the principle of an investor operating in a market economy (hereafter referred to as the “market economy investor principle”). Account should therefore be taken of the effective possibilities for a beneficiary undertaking to obtain equivalent financial resources by having recourse to the capital market. State aid is not involved where a new funding source is made available on conditions which would be acceptable for a private operator under the normal conditions of a market economy.

In order to facilitate the assessment of whether the market economy investor principle is fulfilled for a given guarantee measure, the EFTA Surveillance Authority sets out in this section a number of sufficient conditions for the absence of aid. Individual guarantees are covered in point 3.2 with a simpler option for SMEs in point 3.3. Guarantee schemes are covered in point 3.4 with a simpler option for SMEs in point 3.5.

3.2 Individual guarantees

Regarding an individual state guarantee, the EFTA Surveillance Authority considers that the fulfilment of all the following conditions will be sufficient to rule out the presence of state aid.

(a) The borrower is not in financial difficulty.

In order to decide whether the borrower is to be seen as being in financial difficulty, reference should be made to the definition set out in the Chapter of

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5 See Case C-482/99 referred to in footnote 4.
these Guidelines on aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty. SMEs which have been incorporated for less than three years shall not be considered as being in difficulty for that period for the purposes of this Chapter.

(b) The extent of the guarantee can be properly measured when it is granted.

This means that the guarantee must be linked to a specific financial transaction, for a fixed maximum amount and limited in time.

(c) The guarantee does not cover more than 80% of the outstanding loan or other financial obligation; this limitation does not apply to guarantees covering debt securities.

The EFTA Surveillance Authority considers that if a financial obligation is wholly covered by a state guarantee, the lender has less incentive to properly assess, secure and minimise the risk arising from the lending operation, and in particular to properly assess the borrower’s creditworthiness. Such risk assessment might, due to lack of means, not always be taken over by the state guarantor. This lack of incentive to minimise the risk of non-repayment of the loan might encourage lenders to contract loans with a greater than normal commercial risk and could thus increase the amount of higher-risk guarantees in the State’s portfolio.

This limitation of 80% does not apply to a public guarantee granted to finance a company whose activity is solely constituted by a properly entrusted Service of General Economic Interest (SGEI) and when this guarantee has been provided by the public authority having put in place this entrustment. The limitation of 80% applies if the company concerned provides other SGEIs or other economic activities.

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In order to ensure that the lender effectively bears part of the risk, due attention must be given to the following two aspects:

1. when the size of the loan or of the financial obligation decreases over time, for instance because the loan starts to be reimbursed, the guaranteed amount has to decrease proportionally, in such a way that at each moment in time the guarantee does not cover more than 80% of the outstanding loan or financial obligation;

2. losses have to be sustained proportionally and in the same way by the lender and the guarantor. In the same manner, net recoveries (i.e. revenues excluding costs for claim handling) generated from the recuperation of the debt from the securities given by the borrower have to reduce proportionally the losses borne by the lender and the guarantor. First-loss guarantees, where losses are first attributed to the guarantor and only then to the lender, will be regarded as possibly involving aid.

If an EFTA State wishes to provide a guarantee above the 80% threshold and claims that it does not constitute aid, it should duly substantiate the claim, for instance on the basis of the arrangement of the whole transaction, and notify it to the EFTA Surveillance Authority so that the guarantee can be properly assessed with regards to its possible state aid character.

(d) A market-oriented price is paid for the guarantee.

As indicated under point 2.1, risk-carrying should normally be remunerated by an appropriate premium on the guaranteed or counter-guaranteed amount. When the price paid for the guarantee is at least as high as the corresponding guarantee premium benchmark that can be found on the financial markets, the guarantee does not contain aid.

If no corresponding guarantee premium benchmark can be found on the financial markets, the total financial cost of the guaranteed loan, including the interest rate of the loan and the guarantee premium, has to be compared to the market price of a similar non-guaranteed loan.

In both cases, in order to determine the corresponding market price, the characteristics of the guarantee and of the underlying loan should be taken into consideration. This includes: the amount and duration of the transaction; the security given by the borrower and other experience affecting the recovery rate evaluation; the probability of default of the borrower due to its financial position, its sector of activity and prospects; as well as other economic conditions. This analysis should notably allow the borrower to be classified by means of a risk rating. This classification may be provided by an internationally recognised rating agency or, where available, by the internal rating used by the bank providing the underlying loan. The EFTA Surveillance Authority points to the link between rating and default rate made by international financial institutions, whose work is
also publicly available\textsuperscript{10}. To assess whether the premium is in line with the market prices an EFTA State can carry out a comparison of prices paid by similarly rated undertakings on the market.

The EFTA Surveillance Authority will therefore not accept that the guarantee premium is set at a single rate deemed to correspond to an overall industry standard.

3.3 Valuation of individual guarantees for SMEs

As an exception, if the borrower is an SME\textsuperscript{11}, the EFTA Surveillance Authority can by way of derogation from point 3.2.(d) accept a simpler evaluation of whether or not a loan guarantee involves aid. In that case, and provided all the other conditions laid down in points 3.2.(a), (b) and (c) are met, a state guarantee would be deemed as not constituting aid if the minimum annual premium (“safe harbour premium”\textsuperscript{12}) set out in the following table is charged on the amount effectively guaranteed by the State, based on the rating of the borrower\textsuperscript{13}:

\textsuperscript{10} Such as Table 1 on agencies’ credit ratings to be found in the Bank for International Settlements Working Paper No 207, available at: http://www.bis.org/publ/work207.pdf.


\textsuperscript{12} These safe-harbour premiums are established in line with the margins determined for loans to similarly rated undertakings in the Chapter of the EFTA Surveillance Authority State Aid Guidelines on the method for setting the reference and discount rates (not yet published). These Guidelines correspond to the Communication from the Commission on the revision of the method for setting the reference and discount rates (OJ C 14, 19.1.2008, p. 6). Following the study commissioned by the European Commission on that topic (http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/state_aid/studies_reports/full_report.pdf — see pages 23 and 156-159 of the study), a general reduction of 20 basis points has been taken into account. This reduction corresponds to the difference in margin for a similar risk between a loan and a guarantee in order to take into account the additional costs specifically linked to loans. The table refers to the rating classes of Standard and Poor’s, Fitch and Moody’s, which are the rating agencies most frequently used by the banking sector in order to link their own rating system, as described in point 3.2.(d). However, ratings do not need to be obtained from those specific rating agencies. National rating systems or rating systems used by banks to reflect default rates are equally acceptable provided they supply the one-year probability of default as this figure is used by rating agencies to rank companies. Other systems should allow for a similar classification through this ranking key.

\textsuperscript{13}
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Credit quality</th>
<th>Standard and Poor's</th>
<th>Fitch</th>
<th>Moody's</th>
<th>Annual safe-harbour premium</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Highest quality</td>
<td>AAA</td>
<td>AAA</td>
<td>Aaa</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very strong payment capacity</td>
<td>AA +</td>
<td>AA +</td>
<td>Aa 1</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AA</td>
<td>AA</td>
<td>Aa 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AA –</td>
<td>AA –</td>
<td>Aa 3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong payment capacity</td>
<td>A +</td>
<td>A +</td>
<td>A 1</td>
<td>0.55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A –</td>
<td>A –</td>
<td>A 3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adequate payment capacity</td>
<td>BBB +</td>
<td>BBB +</td>
<td>Baa 1</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BBB</td>
<td>BBB</td>
<td>Baa 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BBB –</td>
<td>BBB –</td>
<td>Baa 3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Payment capacity is vulnerable to adverse conditions</td>
<td>BB +</td>
<td>BB +</td>
<td>Ba 1</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BB</td>
<td>BB</td>
<td>Ba 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BB –</td>
<td>BB –</td>
<td>Ba 3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B +</td>
<td>B +</td>
<td>B 1</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B –</td>
<td>B –</td>
<td>B 2</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>B 3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Payment capacity is likely to be impaired by adverse conditions</td>
<td>CCC +</td>
<td>CCC +</td>
<td>Caa 1</td>
<td>No safe-harbour annual premium can be provided</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CCC</td>
<td>CCC</td>
<td>Caa 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CCC –</td>
<td>CCC –</td>
<td>Caa 3</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CC</td>
<td>CC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C</td>
<td>C</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In or near default</td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>DDD</td>
<td>Ca</td>
<td>No safe-harbour annual premium can be provided</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D</td>
<td>DD</td>
<td>C</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The safe-harbour premiums apply to the amount effectively guaranteed or counter-guaranteed by the State at the beginning of each year concerned. They must be considered as the minimum to be applied with respect to a company whose credit rating is at least equal to those given in the table 14.

In the case of a single upfront guarantee premium, the loan guarantee is deemed to be free of aid if it is at least equal to the present value of the future guarantee premiums as indicated above, the discount rate used being the corresponding reference rate 15.

As outlined in the table above, companies with a rating corresponding to CCC/Caa or worse cannot benefit from this simplified methodology.

For SMEs which do not have a credit history or a rating based on a balance sheet approach, such as certain special purpose companies or start-up companies, the safe-

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14 For example, a company to which a bank assigns a credit rating corresponding to BBB-/Baa 3 should be charged a yearly guarantee premium of at least 0.8% on the amount effectively guaranteed by the State at the beginning of each year.

15 See the Guidelines referred to in footnote 12 providing that: “The reference rate is also to be used as a discount rate, for calculating present values. To that end, in principle, the base rate increased by a fixed margin of 100 basis points will be used.” (p. 4).
harbour premium is set at 3.8% but this can never be lower than the premium which would be applicable to the parent company or companies.

These margins may be revised from time to time to take account of the market situation.

3.4 Guarantee schemes

For a state guarantee scheme, the EFTA Surveillance Authority considers that the fulfilment of all the following conditions will rule out the presence of state aid:

(a) The scheme is closed to borrowers in financial difficulty (see details in point 3.2.(a)).

(b) The extent of the guarantees can be properly measured when they are granted. This means that the guarantees must be linked to specific financial transactions, for a fixed maximum amount and limited in time.

(c) The guarantees do not cover more than 80% of each outstanding loan or other financial obligation (see details and exceptions in point 3.2.(c)).

(d) The terms of the scheme are based on a realistic assessment of the risk so that the premiums paid by the beneficiaries make it, in all probability, self-financing. The self-financing nature of the scheme and the proper risk orientation are viewed by the EFTA Surveillance Authority as indications that the guarantee premiums charged under the scheme are in line with market prices.

This entails that the risk of each new guarantee has to be assessed, on the basis of all the relevant factors (quality of the borrower, securities, duration of the guarantee, etc). On the basis of this risk analysis, risk classes16 have to be defined, the guarantee has to be classified in one of these risk classes and the corresponding guarantee premium has to be charged on the guaranteed or counter-guaranteed amount.

(e) In order to have a proper and progressive evaluation of the self-financing aspect of the scheme, the adequacy of the level of the premiums has to be reviewed at least once a year on the basis of the effective loss rate of the scheme over an economically reasonable time horizon, and premiums adjusted accordingly if there is a risk that the scheme may no longer be self-financing. This adjustment may concern all issued and future guarantees or only the latter.

(f) In order to be viewed as being in line with market prices, the premiums charged have to cover the normal risks associated with granting the guarantee, the administrative costs of the scheme, and a yearly remuneration of an adequate capital, even if the latter is not at all or only partially constituted.

As regards administrative costs, these should include at least the specific initial risk assessment as well as the risk monitoring and risk management costs linked to the granting and administration of the guarantee.

As regards the remuneration of the capital, the EFTA Surveillance Authority observes that usual guarantors are subject to capital requirement rules and, in

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16 See further details in footnote 13.
accordance with these rules, are forced to constitute equity in order not to go bankrupt when there are variations in the yearly losses related to the guarantees. State guarantee schemes are normally not subject to these rules and thus do not need to constitute such reserves. In other words, each time the losses stemming from the guarantees exceed the revenues from the guarantee premiums, the deficit is simply covered by the state budget. This state guarantee to the scheme puts the latter in a more favourable situation than a usual guarantor. In order to avoid this disparity and to remunerate the State for the risk it is taking, the EFTA Surveillance Authority considers that the guarantee premiums have to cover the remuneration of an adequate capital.

The EFTA Surveillance Authority considers that this capital has to correspond to 8%\(^\text{17}\) of the outstanding guarantees. For guarantees granted to undertakings whose rating is equivalent to AAA/AA- (Aaa/Aa3), the amount of capital to be remunerated can be reduced to 2% of the outstanding guarantees. Meanwhile, with regard to guarantees granted to undertakings whose rating is equivalent to A+/A- (A1/A3), the amount of capital to be remunerated can be reduced to 4% of the outstanding guarantees.

The normal remuneration of this capital is made up of a risk premium, possibly increased by the risk-free interest rate.

The risk premium must be paid to the State on the adequate amount of capital in all cases. Based on its practice and the practice of the European Commission, the EFTA Surveillance Authority considers that a normal risk premium for equity amounts to at least 400 basis points and that such risk premium should be included in the guarantee premium charged to the beneficiaries\(^\text{18}\).

If, as in most state guarantee schemes, the capital is not provided to the scheme and therefore there is no cash contribution by the State, the risk-free interest rate does not have to be taken into account. Alternatively, if the underlying capital is effectively provided by the State, the State has to incur borrowing costs and the scheme benefits from this cash by possibly investing it. Therefore the risk-free interest rate has to be paid to the State on the amount provided. Moreover, this charge should be taken from the financial income of the scheme and does not


\(^{18}\) For a guarantee to a BBB rated company amounting to 100, the reserves to be constituted thus amount to 8. Applying 400 basis points (or 4%) to this amount results in annual capital costs of 8%*4% = 0.32% of the guaranteed amount, which will impact the price of the guarantee accordingly. If the one-year default rate anticipated by the scheme for this company is, for instance, 0.35% and the yearly administrative costs are estimated at 0.1%, the price of the guarantee deemed as non-aid will be 0.77% per year.
necessarily have to impact the guarantee premiums\(^{19}\). The EFTA Surveillance Authority considers that the yield of the 10-year government bond may be used as a suitable proxy for the risk-free rate taken as normal return on capital.

\(g\) In order to ensure transparency, the scheme must provide for the terms on which future guarantees will be granted, such as eligible companies in terms of rating and, when applicable, sector and size, maximum amount and duration of the guarantees.

### 3.5 Valuation of guarantee schemes for SMEs

In view of the specific situation of SMEs and in order to facilitate their access to finance, especially through the use of guarantee schemes, two specific possibilities exist for such companies:

6. the use of safe harbour premiums as defined for individual guarantees to SMEs;

7. the valuation of guarantee schemes as such by allowing the application of a single premium and avoiding the need for individual ratings of beneficiary SMEs.

The conditions of use of both rules are defined as follows:

**Use of safe-harbour premiums in guarantee schemes for SMEs**

In line with what is proposed for simplification purposes in relation to individual guarantees, guarantee schemes in favour of SMEs can also, in principle, be deemed self-financing and not constitute state aid if the minimum safe-harbour premiums set out in point 3.3 and based on the ratings of undertakings are applied\(^{20}\). The other conditions set out in points 3.4.(a), (b) and (c) as well as in point 3.4.(g) still have to be fulfilled, and the conditions set out in points 3.4.(d), (e) and (f) are deemed to be fulfilled by the use of the minimum annual premiums set out in point 3.3.

**Use of single premiums in guarantee schemes for SMEs**

The EFTA Surveillance Authority is aware that carrying out an individual risk assessment of each borrower is a costly process, which may not be appropriate where a scheme covers a large number of small loans for which it represents a risk pooling tool.

Consequently, where a scheme only relates to guarantees for SMEs and the guaranteed amount does not exceed a threshold of EUR 2.5 million per company in that scheme, the EFTA Surveillance Authority may accept, by way of derogation from point 3.4.(d), a single yearly guarantee premium for all borrowers. However, in order for the guarantees granted under such a scheme to be regarded as not constituting state aid, the scheme has to remain self-financing and all the other conditions set out in points 3.4.(a), (b) and (c) as well as in points 3.4.(e), (f) and (g) still have to be fulfilled.

\(^{19}\) In that case, and provided the risk-free rate is deemed to be 5\%, the annual cost of the reserves to be constituted will be, for the same guarantee of 100 and reserves of 8 to be constituted, 8\% \(*(4\%+5\%)=0.72\%\) of the guaranteed amount. Under the same assumptions (default rate of 0.35\% and administrative costs of 0.1\%), the price of the guarantee would be 0.77\% per year and an additional charge of 0.4\% should be paid by the scheme to the State.

\(^{20}\) This includes the provision whereby for SMEs which do not have a credit history or a rating based on a balance sheet approach, the safe-harbour premium is set at 3.8\% but this can never be lower than the premium which would be applicable to the parent companies.
3.6 No automatic classification as state aid

Failure to comply with any one of the conditions set out in points 3.2 to 3.5 does not mean that the guarantee or guarantee scheme is automatically regarded as state aid. If there is any doubt as to whether a planned guarantee or guarantee scheme constitutes state aid, it should be notified to the EFTA Surveillance Authority.

4 Guarantees with an aid element

4.1 General

Where an individual guarantee or a guarantee scheme does not comply with the market economy investor principle, it is deemed to entail state aid. The state aid element therefore needs to be quantified in order to check whether the aid may be found compatible under a specific state aid exemption. As a matter of principle, the state aid element will be deemed to be the difference between the appropriate market price of the guarantee provided individually or through a scheme and the actual price paid for that measure.

The resulting yearly cash grant equivalents should be discounted to their present value using the reference rate, then added up to obtain the total grant equivalent.

When calculating the aid element in a guarantee, the EFTA Surveillance Authority will devote special attention to the following elements:

(a) Whether in the case of individual guarantees the borrower is in financial difficulty. Whether in the case of guarantee schemes, the eligibility criteria of the scheme provide for exclusion of such undertakings (see details in point 3.2.(a)).

The EFTA Surveillance Authority notes that for companies in difficulty, a market guarantor, if any, would, at the time the guarantee is granted charge a high premium given the expected rate of default. If the likelihood that the borrower will not be able to repay the loan becomes particularly high, this market rate may not exist and in exceptional circumstances the aid element of the guarantee may turn out to be as high as the amount effectively covered by that guarantee.

(b) Whether the extent of each guarantee can be properly measured when it is granted.

This means that the guarantees must be linked to a specific financial transaction, for a fixed maximum amount and limited in time. In this connection the EFTA Surveillance Authority considers in principle that unlimited guarantees are incompatible with Article 61 of the EEA Agreement.

(c) Whether the guarantee covers more than 80% of each outstanding loan or other financial obligation (see details and exceptions in point 3.2.(c)).

In order to ensure that the lender has a real incentive to properly assess, secure and minimise the risk arising from the lending operation, and in particular to assess properly the borrower’s creditworthiness, the EFTA Surveillance Authority considers that a percentage of at least 20% not covered by a state
guarantee should be carried by the lender\textsuperscript{21} to properly secure its loans and to minimise the risk associated with the transaction. The EFTA Surveillance Authority will therefore, in general, examine more thoroughly any guarantee or guarantee scheme covering the entirety (or nearly the entirety) of a financial transaction except if an EFTA State duly justifies it, for instance, by the specific nature of the transaction.

\textbf{(d) Whether the specific characteristics of the guarantee and loan (or other financial obligation) have been taken into account when determining the market premium of the guarantee, from which the aid element is calculated by comparing it with the premium actually paid (see details in point 3.2.(d)).}

\section*{4.2 Aid element in individual guarantees}

For an individual guarantee the cash grant equivalent of a guarantee should be calculated as the difference between the market price of the guarantee and the price actually paid.

Where the market does not provide guarantees for the type of transaction concerned, no market price for the guarantee is available. In that case, the aid element should be calculated in the same way as the grant equivalent of a soft loan, namely as the difference between the specific market interest rate this company would have borne without the guarantee and the interest rate obtained by means of the state guarantee after any premiums paid have been taken into account. If there is no market interest rate and if the EFTA State wishes to use the reference rate as a proxy, the EFTA Surveillance Authority stresses that the conditions laid down in the Chapter of the Authority’s State Aid Guidelines on reference rates\textsuperscript{22} are valid to calculate the aid intensity of an individual guarantee. This means that due attention must be paid to the top-up to be added to the base rate in order to take into account the relevant risk profile linked to the operation covered, the undertaking guaranteed and the collaterals provided.

\section*{4.3 Aid element in individual guarantees for SMEs}

For SMEs, the simplified evaluation system outlined in point 3.3 can also be applied. In that case, if the premium for a given guarantee does not correspond to the value set as a minimum for its rating class, the difference between this minimum level and the premium charged will be regarded as aid. If the guarantee lasts more than a year, the yearly shortfalls are discounted using the relevant reference rate\textsuperscript{23}.

Only in cases clearly evidenced and duly justified by the EFTA State concerned may the EFTA Surveillance Authority accept a deviation from these rules. A risk-based approach still has to be respected in such cases.

\section*{4.4 Aid element in guarantee schemes}

For guarantee schemes, the cash grant equivalent of each guarantee within the scheme is the difference between the premium effectively charged (if any) and the premium that

\textsuperscript{21} This is based on the assumption that the corresponding level of security is provided by the company to the State and the credit institution.

\textsuperscript{22} See the Chapter referred to in footnote 12.

\textsuperscript{23} See further details in footnote 15.
should be charged in an equivalent non-aid scheme set up in accordance with the conditions laid down in point 3.4. The aforementioned theoretical premiums from which the aid element is calculated have therefore to cover the normal risks associated with the guarantee as well as the administrative and capital costs\(^{24}\). This way of calculating the grant equivalent is aimed at ensuring that, also over the medium and long term, the total aid granted under the scheme is equal to the money injected by the public authorities to cover the deficit of the scheme.

Since, in the case of state guarantee schemes, the specific features of the individual cases may not be known at the time when the scheme is to be assessed, the aid element must be assessed by reference to the provisions of the scheme.

Aid elements in guarantee schemes can also be calculated through methodologies already accepted by the EFTA Surveillance Authority following their notification under an Act incorporated into the EEA Agreement in the field of state aid, such as Commission Regulation (EC) No 1628/2006 of 24 October 2006 on the application of Articles 87 and 88 of the Treaty to national regional investment aid,\(^{25}\) provided that the approved methodology explicitly addresses the type of guarantees and the type of underlying transactions at stake.

Only in cases clearly evidenced and duly justified by the EFTA State concerned may the EFTA Surveillance Authority accept a deviation from these rules. A risk-based approach still has to be respected in such cases.

4.5 Aid element in guarantee schemes for SMEs

The two simplification tools outlined in point 3.5 and relating to guarantee schemes for SMEs can also be used for aid calculation purposes. The conditions of use of both rules are defined as follows:

**Use of safe-harbour premiums in guarantee schemes for SMEs**

For SMEs, the simplified evaluation system outlined above in point 3.5 can also be applied. In that case, if the premium for a given category in a guarantee scheme does not correspond to the value set as a minimum for its rating class\(^{26}\), the difference between this minimum level and the premium charged will be regarded as aid\(^{27}\). If the guarantee lasts more than a year, the yearly shortfalls are discounted using the reference rate\(^{28}\).

**Use of single premiums in guarantee schemes for SMEs**

In view of the more limited distortion of competition that may be caused by state aid provided in the framework of a guarantee scheme for SMEs, the EFTA Surveillance Authority

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\(^{24}\) This calculation can be summarised, for each risk class, as the difference between (a) the outstanding sum guaranteed, multiplied by the risk factor of the risk class ("risk" being the probability of default after inclusion of administrative and capital costs), which represents the market premium, and (b) any premium paid, i.e. (guaranteed sum × risk) – premium paid.


\(^{26}\) This includes the possibility whereby SMEs which do not have a credit history or a rating based on a balance sheet approach, the safe-harbour premium is set at 3.8% but this can never be lower than the premium which would be applicable to the parent company or companies.

\(^{27}\) This calculation can be summarised, for each risk class, as the outstanding sum guaranteed multiplied by the difference between (a) the safe-harbour premium percentage of that risk class and (b) the premium percentage paid, i.e. guaranteed sum × (safe-harbour premium – premium paid).

\(^{28}\) See further details in footnote 12.
Authority considers that if an aid scheme only relates to guarantees for SMEs, where the guaranteed amount does not exceed a threshold of EUR 2.5 million per company in this given scheme, the EFTA Surveillance Authority may accept, by way of derogation from point 4.4, a valuation of the aid intensity of the scheme as such, without the need to carry out a valuation for each individual guarantee or risk class within the scheme29.

5 Compatibility with the functioning of the EEA agreement of state aid in the form of guarantees

5.1 General
State guarantees within the scope of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement must be examined by the EFTA Surveillance Authority with a view to determining whether or not they are compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. Before such assessment of compatibility can be made, the beneficiary of the aid must be identified.

5.2 Assessment
Whether or not this aid is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement will be examined by the EFTA Surveillance Authority according to the same rules as are applied to aid measures taking other forms. The concrete criteria for the compatibility assessment have been clarified and detailed by the EFTA Surveillance Authority in its State Aid Guidelines 30. The examination will take into account, in particular, the aid intensity, the characteristics of the beneficiaries and the objectives pursued.

5.3 Conditions
The EFTA Surveillance Authority will accept guarantees only if their mobilisation is contractually linked to specific conditions which may go as far as the compulsory declaration of bankruptcy of the beneficiary undertaking, or any similar procedure. These conditions will have to be agreed between the parties when the guarantee is initially granted. In the event that an EFTA State wants to mobilise the guarantee under conditions other than those initially agreed to at the granting stage, then the EFTA Surveillance Authority will regard the mobilisation of the guarantee as creating new aid which has to be notified under Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement.

6 Reports to be presented to the EFTA Surveillance Authority by EFTA states
In accordance with general monitoring obligations31, in order to further monitor new developments on the financial markets and since the value of state guarantees is difficult

29 This calculation can be summarised, irrespective of the risk class, as the difference between (a) the outstanding sum guaranteed, multiplied by the risk factor of the scheme (“risk” being the probability of default after inclusion of administrative and capital costs), and (b) any premium paid, i.e. (guaranteed sum × risk) – premium paid.
to assess and changes over time, the constant review, pursuant to Article 62(1) of the EEA Agreement, of state guarantee schemes approved by the EFTA Surveillance Authority is of particular importance. EFTA States shall therefore submit reports to the EFTA Surveillance Authority.

For aid guarantee schemes, these reports will have to be presented at least at the end of the period of validity of the guarantee scheme and for the notification of an amended scheme. The EFTA Surveillance Authority may however consider it appropriate to request reports on a more frequent basis, depending on the case.

For guarantee schemes, for which the EFTA Surveillance Authority has taken a non-aid decision, and especially when no solid historic data exists for the scheme, the EFTA Surveillance Authority may request, when taking its non-aid decision for such reports to be presented, thereby clarifying on a case-by-case basis the frequency and the content of the reporting requirement.

Reports should include at least the following information:

(a) the number and amount of guarantees issued;

(b) the number and amount of guarantees outstanding at the end of the period;

(c) the number and value of defaulted guarantees (displayed individually) on a yearly basis;

(d) the yearly income:
   (1) income from the premiums charged;
   (2) income from recoveries;
   (3) other revenues (e.g. interest received on deposits or investments);

(e) the yearly costs:
   (1) administrative costs;
   (2) indemnifications paid on mobilised guarantees;

(f) the yearly surplus or shortfall (difference between income and costs); and

(g) the accumulated surplus or shortfall since the beginning of the scheme.

For individual guarantees, the relevant information, mainly that referred to in points (d) to (g), should be similarly reported.

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If the scheme has been active for more than 10 years, only the last 10 annual amounts of shortfall or surplus are to be provided.

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In all cases, the EFTA Surveillance Authority draws the attention of EFTA States to the fact that correct reporting at a remote date presupposes correct collection of the necessary data from the beginning of the use of the scheme and their aggregation on a yearly basis.

The attention of EFTA States is also drawn to the fact that for non-aid guarantees provided individually or under a scheme, although no notification obligation exists, the EFTA Surveillance Authority may have to verify that the guarantee or scheme does not entail aid elements, for instance following a complaint. In that case, the EFTA Surveillance Authority will request information similar to that set out above for reports from the EFTA State concerned.

Where reports already have to be presented following specific reporting obligations established by block exemption regulations, guidelines or frameworks applicable in the state aid field, those specific reports will replace the reports to be presented under the present guarantee reporting obligation provided the information listed above is included.

7 Implementing measures

The EFTA Surveillance Authority invites EFTA States to adjust their existing guarantee measures to the stipulations of the present Chapter by 1 January 2010 as far as new guarantees are concerned.